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DOMESTIC LAW
I. EQUITABLE DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
A. Division of Professional Degree
In Helm v. Helm' the South Carolina Supreme Court ad-
dressed for the first time the propriety of including a profes-
sional degree or license2 in the property subject to division in a
divorce. The court held that a professional degree was "a per-
sonal intellectual attainment"3 and not subject to equitable dis-
tribution4 under section 20-7-420 of the Code."
Petitioner (the wife) and respondent (the husband) were
married on June 21, 1975, in St. Louis, Missouri.' On July 23,
1982, the couple separated. Subsequently, the wife petitioned
the family court for separate support and maintenance. In addi-
tion, the wife sought division of the marital property which, she
asserted, included the husband's medical degree. The husband
counterclaimed in an "Amended Answer" for divorce on the
grounds of one year's separation.'
1. 289 S.C. 169, 345 S.E.2d 720 (1986).
2. Although there is no basis for limiting the application of equitable distribution
to professional degrees, the majority of the situations involve professional degrees in
such areas as medicine, law, or business. See Note, Family Law: Ought a Professional
Degree Be Divisible Property Upon Divorce, 22 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 517, 518 n. 5
(1981).
3. 289 S.C. at 171, 345 S.E.2d at 721.
4. "Equitable distribution is a method of allocating property upon divorce based
upon the concept that marriage is a partnership or shared enterprise. At the heart of this
concept is the realization that both spouses contribute to the economic circumstances of
a marriage ... ." L. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 1.01 (1983).
5. The pertinent part of this section defines the property subject to settlement as
"the real and personal property of the marriage." S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(2) (Law. Co-
op. 1985).
6. Record at 3.
7. 289 S.C. at 170, 345 S.E.2d at 720. In addition, the wife filed a "Supplemental
Petition" which prayed for divorce on the grounds of one year's separation and for ali-
mony rather than the separate support and maintenance. Id. at 170-71, 345 S.E. 2d at
720-21. The family court granted the husband's motion to strike this "Supplemental Pe-
tition" and denied the wife's motion to strike the husband's "Amended Answer." Id. at
171, 345 S.E.2d at 721. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the family court's
granting of the husband's motion, but reversed the family court's denial of the wife's
1
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After a full hearing, the family court granted the husband's
prayer for divorce and awarded the wife exclusive title to the
marital residence, the automobile, certain household furnishings
and a joint bank account,8 but denied her request for alimony.
Furthermore, the family court held the medical degree to be in-
appropriate for equitable distribution." On appeal the supreme
court determined that the pleadings were insufficient to support
the husband's decree of divorce. The supreme court, however,
affirmed the family court's refusal to subject the husband's med-
ical degree to equitable apportionment. 10
In refusing to divide the medical degree, the court cited
general authority without discussion and failed to enumerate the
parameters of its holding. Stating that the majority of jurisdic-
tions consider a professional degree to be a "personal intellec-
tual attainment,"" the court held the husband's medical degree
was not marital property and, therefore, was not subject to equi-
table distribution. This decision reflects the court's reluctance to
extend the "concept of property to include assets which were ob-
tained by virtue of personal acumen."' 2 Under this view, the
professional degree would not be subject to equitable distribu-
tion because it cannot be characterized as possessing the usual
attributes of property."
motion to strike the husband's "Amended Answer" and remanded the issue for further
consideration. Id. at 172, 345 S.E.2d at 722.
8. Id. at 171, 345 S.E.2d at 721.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 173, 345 S.E.2d at 722.
11. Id. at 171, 345 S.E.2d at 721.
12. L. GOLDEN, supra note 4, at § 6.18.
13. The leading case supporting the exclusion of a professional degree from equita-
ble distribution is In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978). In refus-
ing to divide a masters degree, the Colorado Supreme Court stated as follows:
An educational degree ... is simply not encompassed even by the broad view
of the concept of property. It does not have an exchange value or an objective
transferable value on the open market. It is personal to the holder. It termi-
nates on the death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned,
sold, transferred, conveyed or pledged. An advanced degree is a cumulative
product of many years of previous education, combined with diligence and
hard work. It may not be acquired by the mere expenditure of money. It is
simply an intellectual achievement that may potentially assist in the future
acquisition of property. In our view, it has none of the attributes of property in
the usual sense of the term.
Id. at 432, 574 P.2d at 77; accord, Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (1981);
In re Marriage of Goldstein, 97 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 423 N.E.2d 1201 (1981).
[Vol. 39
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Other jurisdictions have denied equitable division of profes-
sional degrees not only because of the classification problems,
but also because of the difficulty in determining a definitive
value for the degree. Some courts have used post-divorce earn-
ings in determining the value of the degree,14 but other jurisdic-
tions consider this method to be overly speculative. 15
The Helm court ignored authority in those jurisdictions
which found a property interest to exist in a professional degree,
education, or license. In Daniels v. Daniels6 the Court of Ap-
peals of Ohio held that the husband's medical education, "being
in nature of a franchise, constitutes property which the trial
court had a right to consider in making the award of alimony.
'1
7
Applying similar reasoning, the New York Court of Appeals re-
cently held a medical degree to be marital property.'" This deci-
sion, however, can be attributed to the New York court's inter-
14. See In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979);
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982). The criticism relating to the
division of post-divorce earnings of a spouse is based on the conflict between accepted
procedure and the underlying premise of equitable distribution that only assets acquired
during marriage are subject to division.
15. See DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (1980), describing the
speculative nature of such a division as follows:
[W]hether a professional education is and will be of future value to its recipi-
ent is a matter resting on factors which are at best difficult to anticipate or
measure. A person qualified by education for a given profession may choose
not to practice it, may fail at it, or may practice in a specialty, location or
manner which generates less than the average income enjoyed by fellow profes-
sionals. The potential worth of the education may never be realized for these
or many other reasons. An award based upon the prediction of the degree
holder's success at the chosen field may bear no relationship to the reality he
or she faces after divorce.
Id. at 58, 296 N.W.2d at 768.
16. 20 Ohio Op. 2d 458, 185 N.E.2d 773 (1961).
17. Id. at 459, 185 N.E.2d at 775. Based on the financial position of the parties at
the time the decree of divorce was made, the court determined that the husband's medi-
cal degree was the principle asset of the marriage. Although the court recognized the
importance of the husband's intelligence and ambition in obtaining the degree, the court
still classified the medical degree as property. In Daniels the wife's father contributed
substantially to the couple's living expenses and the husband's educational expenses.
The court determined that such financial assistance made it possible for the husband to
obtain his degree. Moreover, in defining the medical degree as a "franchise," the court
held that the ability to practice medicine was a "right" that provided an increased op-
portunity for earning power. In Dworken v. Apartment House Owners' Ass'n, 38 Ohio
App. 265, 176 N.E. 577 (1931), the court determined that this right was a franchise "with
the attributes of property generally." Id. at 266, 176 N.E. at 578.
18. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
3
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pretation of marital property under the applicable law.19
Alternatively, some jurisdictions have held that the future earn-
ings generated from a professional degree develop into a marital
asset subject to division.20
Although sound in its reasoning, the rule derived from the
Helm decision will have inequitable results if applied in a per se
manner. The inequity would be most evident when the divorce
occurs soon after one spouse has obtained his or her professional
degree, but has not yet established his or her career. In these
situations the professional degree may constitute the sole asset
of the couple's marriage.21 Failure to make equitable division of
the professional degree would leave the "non-degree-earning"
spouse uncompensated for contributions made to the "degree-
earning" spouse's education.22 In Helm this unfairness was
clearly present. During their marriage, from 1975 to 1982, the
husband obtained a masters degree in biology and a medical de-
gree, and completed his medical internship,23 while his wife held
various jobs, earned most of the couple's living expenses, and
contributed to the husband's educational expenses.24
To prevent this inequity to the contributing spouse, other
19. In interpreting the Equitable Distribution Law, the court stated as follows:
[T]he New York Legislature deliberately went beyond traditional property
concepts when it formulated the Equitable Distribution Law. . . . [O]ur stat-
ute recognizes that spouses have an equitable claim to things of value arising
out of the marital relationship and classifies them as subject to distribution by
focusing on the marital status of the parties at the time of acquisition.
Id. at 583, 489 N.E.2d at 715, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 746 (citation omitted).
20. A thorough and perceptive analysis of this reasoning can be found in Herring,
Divisibility of Advanced Degrees in North Carolina-An Examination And Proposal, 15
N.C.C.L.J. 1, 11-13 (1985); see also L. GOLDEN, supra note 4, § G.20.
21. See, e.g., 66 N.Y.2d 76, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743.
22. Herring, Divisibility of Advanced Degrees and Equitable Distribution States,
19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 9 (1985).
23. Brief of Appellant at 27.
24. Id. For the period from 1975 to 1981 the comparative incomes for the spouses
were as follows:
Wife Husband
1975 2,561.76 ( 74%) 910.74 (26%)
1976 5,719.24 ( 89%) 737.83 (11%)
1977 9,183.00 ( 76%) 284.60 (24%)
1978 16,705.55 ( 92%) 1,433.94 ( 8%)
1979 15,502.00 (100%) .00 ( 0%)
1980 16,530.00 (91%) 1,558.00 ( 9%)
1981 17,209.00 (65%) 9,209.00 (35%)
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jurisdictions have established remedies outside the equitable
distribution of a professional degree. These remedies have fo-
cused on equitable principles such as restitution and unjust en-
richment rather than the applicable statutory or common-law
solutions. In Mahoney v. Mahoney25 the New Jersey Supreme
Court refused to characterize the husband's professional degree
as marital property. The court instead based its award on the
"supporting spouse's shared expectation of future advantages.""
This decision would be applicable specifically to situations simi-
lar to the one in Helm in which a "young professional who after
being supported through graduate school leaves his mate for
greener pastures. ' 27 As the court noted, "One spouse ought not
to receive a divorce complaint when the other receives a di-
ploma. ' 28 The doctrine of unjust enrichment also was applied in
Hubbard v. Hubbard29 to provide an award based on "equity
and natural justice."30 Regardless of the characterization given
the professional degree, these decisions make clear that the in-
equity in a failure to divide a professional degree will continue
to be an important issue." The wife in Helm was denied equita-
ble relief by the supreme court because the issue regarding such
relief was not properly before the court on appeal.2
25. 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982). In Mahoney the court determined that the
supporting spouse should be reimbursed for the financial contributions made regardless
of the classification of the professional degree. The court held as follows:
[R]egardless of the appropriateness of permanent alimony or the presence or
absence of marital property to be equitably distributed, there will be circum-
stances where a supporting spouse should be reimbursed for the financial con-
tributions he or she made to the spouse's successful professional training. Such
reimbursement alimony should cover all financial contributions toward the for-
mer spouse's education, including household expenses, educational costs,
school travel, expenses and any other contributions used by the supported
spouse in obtaining his or her degree or license.
Id. at 492, 453 A.2d at 534 (emphasis in original).
26. Id. at 500-01, 453 A.2d at 533-34.
27. Id. at 503, 453 A.2d at 535.
28. Id. (citing N.Y. Times, Nov 21, 1982, at 72, col.2).
29. 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
30. Id. at 750.
31. Herring, supra note 20, at 7-11.
32. 289 S.C. at 172, 345 S.E.2d at 721. The court cited several examples: Inman v.
Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1983) (the court, in dicta, refused to classify a professional
degree as marital property, but noted that supporting spouse was entitled to compensa-
tion); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d at 751 (establishing an equitable remedy to the
supporting spouse equal to "direct support in school and professional training expenses,
plus reasonable interest and adjustments for inflation").
1987]
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In Helm the supreme court's cursory opinion definitively ex-
cluded professional degrees from the equitable distribution of
marital property because of the personal nature of the profes-
sional degree. The supreme court mentioned briefly that other
possible equitable remedies may be available in similar situa-
tions. Because the court did not establish guidelines concerning
qualifications for and application of alternate remedies, determi-
nation of the guiding principles will be left to future litigation
for resolution.
Michael D. Carrouth
B. Division of Business Goodwill*
In Casey v. Casey33 the South Carolina Court of Appeals
held that the asset value of the goodwill of a sole proprietorship
is marital property subject to equitable division in a divorce ac-
tion. This decision places South Carolina among the majority of
jurisdictions that recognize that goodwill, though difficult to
value, is a marital asset subject to division. 4
The family court granted Joyce Casey a divorce in March
1981 on the grounds of continuous separation for one year. As a
part of the division of the marital estate, the court awarded Mrs.
Casey $10,500 which represented a 21% interest in the goodwill
of Jim Casey's Fireworks,35 a sole proprietorship owned by John
Casey, the husband. Mr. Casey had acquired the business from
* The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's decision in
Casey v. Casey but the court of appeal's opinion remains important for its analysis of the
question. Casey v. Casey, No. 22783, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 29 (S.C. Oct. 12, 1987).
33. 289 S.C. 462, 346 S.E.2d 726 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. granted in part and denied
in part, 291 S.C. 284, 353 S.E.2d 287 (1987).
34. See Heller v. Heller, 672 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (goodwill in husband's
accounting practice); Weaver v. Weaver, 72 N.C. App. 409, 324 S.E.2d 925 (1985) (part-
ner's interest in accounting firm's goodwill); Jondahl v. Jondahl, 344 N.W.2d 63 (N.D.
1984) (goodwill of husband's solely owned tax service); In re Marriage of Hall, 103 Wash.
2d 236, 692 P.2d 175 (1984) (goodwill in medical practice); see also Rostel v. Rostel, 622
P.2d 429 (Alaska 1981); Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1969);
In re Marriage of Nichold, 43 Colo. App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314 (1979); In re Marriage of
White, 98 Ill. App. 3d 380, 424 N.E.2d 421 (1981); Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d
1 (1983); Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975); Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262
N.W.2d 487 (N.D. 1978).
35. 289 S.C. at 465 n. 1, 346 S.E.2d at 728 n. 1. The court of appeals noted that it
was interpreting the family court judge's award as an award of 21% of the business.
Otherwise, there was no award of the value of the tangible assets of the business.
[Vol. 39
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his father, its founder, in 1976.
The court of appeals affirmed the family court's ruling that
the goodwill of a sole proprietorship may constitute a marital
asset subject to division, but reversed and remanded the lower
court's valuation of the goodwill. The court began its analysis by
reaffirming the principle that findings regarding the equitable
distribution of marital assets in South Carolina rest within the
sound discretion of the family court judge.36 The court also de-
termined that the family court judge had applied correctly the
factors to be considered in dividing the Casey's property,37 but
the court deemed the record inadequate to support the actual
valuation of goodwill in Jim Casey's Fireworks. At trial an ex-
pert had testified that because the profits of the business far ex-
ceeded a reasonable sum to compensate Mr. Casey as manager,
the business had a goodwill value in excess of the value of its
fixtures and inventory. The expert testified that goodwill value
may be ascertained by using a capitalization of earnings ap-
proach. While a capitalization factor of two and one-half times
the net earnings of the fireworks business could be used to arrive
at the value of goodwill, the expert had been unable to use this,
or any other approach, because "the record [did] not contain
sufficient data concerning the income and expenses of the busi-
ness that would permit a determination of net earnings." 38 The
court also noted that the record contained no evidence of an ap-
propriate managerial fee to deduct from the net earnings as a
salary for Mr. Casey.
39
Although the court adopted the majority rule that goodwill
is a divisible asset, it also noted a Texas decision 0 which illus-
36. Id. at 465, 346 S.E.2d at 728 (citing Smith v. Smith, 280 S.C. 257, 261, 312
S.E.2d 560, 563 (Ct. App. 1984)).
37. The court cited Shaluly v. Shaluly, 284 S.C. 71, 325 S.E.2d 66 (1985), which
approved Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974). Painter listed thirteen
criteria to be used in equitable distribution, including duration of the marriage, the
source of property acquired during the marriage by either or both parties, the value of
the property and its income producing capacities, and the effect of distribution of assets
on the ability to pay alimony and support.
38. 289 S.C. at 467, 346 S.E.2d at 729.
39. Id.
40. Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972), held that the accrued goodwill of a
medical practice based on personal skill, experience, and reputation as well as the expec-
tation that the doctor would continue to practice was not divisible in a divorce proceed-
ing. The court reasoned that it was not a vested property right at the time of the divorce,
nor was it separable from the individual.
1987]
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trates the minority view. The Supreme Court of Texas refused
to divide the value of goodwill when a business depended heav-
ily on the skills and efforts of its owner and reasoned that to do
so would improperly treat the owner's skills or future earnings
as marital property. Recognizing this argument, the Casey court
warned that judges "should be meticulous to distinguish be-
tween the entrepreneurial skills or potential future earnings of a
spouse and the goodwill of the spouse's business.''41
Although Casey established that business goodwill is an as-
set subject to equitable distribution in South Carolina, the ques-
tion of how to value the goodwill remains largely unanswered.
The court recognized the capitalization of earnings approach,
but did not recommend any particular method; instead, the
court called for flexibility in deciding what approach to use in a
particular case.42
Ketta K. Zwibel
II. ALIMONY TERMINATED FOR UNMARRIED COHABITATION
In Palmer v. Palmer43 the South Carolina Court of Appeals
upheld a lower court's decision, based upon the dependent
spouse's unmarried cohabitation with a member of the opposite
sex, to terminate alimony. The court reasoned that the cohabita-
tion sufficiently improved the spouse's financial position to war-
rant termination under state law.44 In its decision the court fol-
lowed a majority of jurisdictions that have confronted the issue
in similar cases.
In November 1978, after nineteen years of marriage, Diana
A. Palmer and Charles Keith Palmer were divorced. In Decem-
ber 1984 the family court found that Diana's cohabitation with
John McKee improved her financial circumstances and the
court, therefore, terminated alimony payments. Diana appealed
the decision to the court of appeals, claiming that evidence
41. 289 S.C. at 467, 346 S.E.2d at 729.
42. See Dibble v. Sumter Ice & Fuel Co., 283 S.C. 278, 322 S.E.2d 674 (Ct. App.
1984) (in valuing a closely held business, a capitalization or net assets approach may be
favorable to a fair market value approach).
43. 289 S.C. 216, 345 S.E.2d 746 (Ct. App. 1986).
44. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-170 (Law. Co-op. 1985) provides for alimony modifica-
tion, confirmation, or termination, after giving both parties an opportunity to be heard,
"as justice and equity shall require."
[Vol. 39
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presented at trial failed to show any real and substantial change
in her financial condition.45
Diana left her job as a school teacher in September 1983 to
work for McKee." In addition to her salary, McKee provided
Diana with two automobiles and paid her expenses on trips to
Las Vegas and Hilton Head. Although Diana maintained a home
in Florence, South Carolina, she lived there only eight to ten
days a month, spending most of her time with McKee at his bus-
iness locations in Mississippi and Tennessee."
The court found that the employment relationship which
Diana alleged was a mere pretense and that she and McKee ac-
tually shared a close personal and emotional relationship. The
court also found that this living arrangement constituted an im-
provement in her financial circumstances warranting termina-
tion of alimony as contemplated by statute.4 The court based
its reasoning on the majority decision in Vance v. Vance49 and
on the concurring opinion of Justice Littlejohn in Jeanes v.
JeanesY' In Vance the court held that living with another, re-
gardless of the relationship involved, changed a wife's financial
circumstances sufficiently to warrant modification of her sup-
port.51 In Jeanes Justice Littlejohn found that a wife's cohabita-
tion fell within the change of circumstances contemplated by the
legislature in section 20-3-170.52
45. 289 S.C. at 217, 345 S.E.2d at 747.
46. Diana received a salary of $1200 per month for services including "coordinating
social activities, maintaining the household and yard, working in the office, and generally
anything McKee [did] not have time to do." Id. Diana also accompanied McKee on busi-
ness trips to Paraguay where she "supervise[d] the preparation of meals, help[ed] with
the house cleaning, and accompanie[d] McKee when he [went] to check on his projects."
Id. at 218, 345 S.E.2d at 748.
47. The court concluded from record testimony that McKee often stayed with Di-
ana in her Florence home, sometimes sleeping with her. Id. Danny Kidd, who rented
Diana's Florence home from September 1983 to January 1984 for a nominal fee, offered
uncontradicted testimony at trial that Diana told him that she was leaving her teaching
position to "live with this man John McKee and that he would support her financially or
pay her teacher's salary, you know, for services rendered." Id. at 217, 345 S.E.2d at 747.
48. Id. at 218, 345 S.E.2d at 748; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-170 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
49. 287 S.C. 612, 340 S.E.2d 554 (Ct. App. 1986).
50. 255 S.C. 161, 177 S.E.2d 537 (1970).
51. 287 S.C. at 615, 340 S.E.2d at 555.
52. 255 S.C. at 170, 177 S.E.2d at 541 (Littlejohn, J., concurring). The Palmer
court rejected Diana's argument that McKee's payments and other support were mere
gratuitous contributions of a third party and should not relieve a supporting spouse's
duty to pay alimony. The appellant relied on Prince v. Prince, 285 S.C. 203, 328 S.E.2d
1987]
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A number of jurisdictions have addressed, with varying re-
suits, the effect of cohabitation by a dependent spouse on the
other's requirement to provide alimony. Those results have been
the subject of much discussion. 3 While states have used both
legislative and judicial approaches in attempting to find a solu-
tion to the problem, a majority of states require a showing of
more than mere cohabitation, particularly an improvement in
the dependent spouse's financial condition, before terminating
or modifying alimony.5 4 This approach seems to be consistent
with a widely recognized proposition that the spouse's financial
need is the primary justification underlying alimony awards.5 A
minority of states, however, follow a "moral outrage" approach
and terminate alimony on mere proof of cohabitation of the de-
pendent spouse.5" Under this approach, the financial need of the
cohabitating spouse is no longer important and alimony is termi-
nated as a form of punishment for unacceptable behavior. A
small number of states take a more formalistic approach and ap-
ply a literal reading to a separation agreement or divorce decree
which often requires the payment of alimony until death or re-
marriage; therefore, cohabitation alone is insufficient reason to
terminate support.5 7 None of these approaches offers an optimal
solution, and instead, they may result in inequity and
664 (Ct. App. 1985), which held that the gratuitous contributions of a third party would
not constitute a change in circumstances warranting alimony modification or termina-
tion. The court, however, distinguished Prince because in Palmer the third party was a
paramour, not a relative. 289 S.C. at 219, 345 S.E.2d at 748.
53. See Oldham, Cohabitation by an Alimony Recipient Revisited, 20 J. FAM. L.
615 (1982) [hereinafter Oldham, Cohabitation Revisited]; Oldham, The Effect of Un-
married Cohabitation by a Former Spouse Upon His or Her Right to Continue to Re-
ceive Alimony, 17 J. FAM. L. 249 (1979); Note, Alimony Modification and Cohabitation
in North Carolina, 63 N.C.L. REv. 794 (1985); Commentary, Alimony, Cohabitation, and
the Wages of Sin: A Statutory Analysis, 33 ALA. L. REV. 577 (1982); Annotation, Di-
vorced or Separated Spouse's Living With Member of Opposite Sex as Affecting Other
Spouse's Obligation of Alimony or Support under Separation Agreement, 47 A.L.R.4TH
38 (1986).
54. Note, supra note 53, at 796-97.
55. Id. at 794.
56. Oldham, Cohabitation Revisited, supra note 53, at 650.
57. Id.; see, e.g., N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 248 (McKinney 1986) which provides as
follows: "The court. . . upon proof that the wife is habitually living with another man
holding herself out as his wife, although not married to such man, may modify such final
judgments." As a result, the existence of at least a "de facto" marriage is required before
alimony can be terminated or modified.
[Vol. 39
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hardship.5
The court of appeals seemed to follow the majority ap-
proach, basing its decision on Diana's support needs and termi-
nating the payments on proof of her improved financial condi-
tion. The court also stated that Diana may reapply for future
modification should her financial circumstances again change. It
is not clear, however, that alimony, once terminated, can be re-
instated, since statutory or judicial authority on this point does
not exist in South Carolina. 59 The court unfortunately used the
word "termination" in its order, connoting a sense of finality
that if interpreted literally, may prevent alimony reinstatement.
In its decision the court supported a longstanding policy
favoring marriage. If the court had allowed Diana to continue
receiving alimony, then she would have had less incentive to re-
marry because she would have been able to draw support from a
58. "If alimony is terminated, it is not revived when the cohabitation ceases, and
no alimony obligation arises from cohabitation, absent an agreement." Oldham, Cohabi-
tation Revisited, supra note 53, at 645 (footnote omitted). The minority approach sim-
ply passes a moral judgment, ignoring the actual support needs of the dependent spouse
and assuming that the third party will provide the necessary support. If the third party
is unable or unwilling to provide support, or if neither party intends to create the
equivalent of a marriage relationship, the dependent spouse will be deprived unfairly of
a right to support. This result may create a potential burden on the state by requiring it
to assume a support role.
Similarly, the formalistic approach also ignores any need for support and allows a
recipient spouse to continue to receive alimony, regardless of the third party's financial
status, by choosing not to remarry. This result would seem to be particularly unfair
should the cohabitating parties indeed enjoy a long-term and committed relationship.
The majority approach may result in unfairness to the payor spouse by creating a poten-
tial for financial manipulation by the cohabitants, allowing the dependent spouse to cre-
ate an apparent perpetual support need. Under any of these approaches, a dependent
spouse may be left without recourse if the alimony payments are terminated
permanently.
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-170 (Law. Co-op. 1985) provides that "either party may
apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order and judgment decreasing or
increasing the amount of such alimony payments or terminating such payments." (em-
phasis added). Such language seems to imply a distinction in the use of the terms "modi-
fication" and "termination," indicating that the legislature may have intended that ter-
mination be final. Contributing to the ambiguity, the statute also provides that modified
judgments are always subject to further modification proceedings, but the statute omits
similar language addressing judgments of termination. Thus, perhaps the court in
Palmer could have used alternative terminology which would have conveyed accurately
the intention of the court. The term "suspension" seems the logical choice for use in the
court order when the court intends that alimony can be reinstated. Another alternative
may be to reduce the alimony to a nominal amount without termination to ensure that a
spouse in need of financial support can again have it increased.
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former husband while living, unmarried, with another man. The
court evidently was aware that cohabitants can manipulate their
financial resources to create an apparent need for support;
therefore, the court set a precedent which will decrease the like-
lihood of successful manipulation in the future. Courts should be
careful, however, to base modifications of alimony on reasons of
support needs and not on moral justifications. Legislation may
restrict judicial discretion by establishing express provisions
dealing with the effect of unmarried cohabitation on the require-
ment of continued support. The potential for adverse financial
consequences to a dependent spouse also would be reduced if
legislation clarified whether alimony can be reinstated once it
has been terminated.
Gregory W. Vanagel
III. UNMARRIED NATURAL MOTHER MAY DENY NATURAL
FATHER PERMISSION TO ADOPT CHILD
In Hucks v. Dolan ° the South Carolina Supreme Court held
in a unanimous decision that a natural mother's denial of per-
mission to the natural father to adopt their child was an abso-
lute bar to the natural father's attempt to adopt their illegiti-
mate son. The Hucks decision is completely in keeping both
with prior South Carolina decisions6l and with the South Caro-
lina Children's Code.2
James Hucks (father) was separated from his wife, and
Donna Dolan (mother) was divorced when the child was born
out of wedlock on April 19, 1978. The South Carolina Depart-
ment of Social Services brought a paternity suit on the mother's
behalf. After paternity was established in February 1982, Hucks
provided support payments required by court order to Dolan
and exercised his visitation rights with his son. The mother re-
married and she and her new husband planned to move with the
child to Texas."3
When Hucks learned of the Dolan's plans, he filed an action
seeking to adopt his son, to extend his visitation rights, and to
60. 288 S.C. 468, 343 S.E.2d 613 (1986).
61. See cases cited infra note 68.
62. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1710 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
63. 288 S.C. at 469, 343 S.E.2d at 614.
[Vol. 39
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change the child's surname to Hucks. The mother refused to
consent to the adoption and cross-petitioned to change the
child's name to Dolan.
6 4
The family court granted Hucks' petition for adoption and
name change and extended his visitation rights. The court also
imposed a guardian ad litem fee upon the father. The mother
appealed the adoption and name change and the father appealed
the assessment of the guardian ad litem fee. The South Carolina
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision to grant
Hucks' petition and reduced the guardian ad litem fee.
The supreme court considered the statutory nature of adop-
tion, the pertinent South Carolina statute requiring maternal
consent, and the effect of adoption on parental rights. The court
stated that "[a] doption exists in this state only by virtue of stat-
utory authority which expressly prescribes the conditions under
which an adoption may legally be effected." 5 In South Carolina,
as in all other states, an adoption is not valid unless made in
accordance with statutory requirements s.6  The South Carolina
adoption statute clearly requires the consent of the mother
67 if
she has done nothing to forfeit her parental rights through aban-
donment or misconduct. There is abundant precedent following
strict statutory construction of this requirement.", When a par-
ent has not forfeited his or her rights, consent is required, even
in situations where the court finds the proposed adoption would
64. Id.
65. Id. at 470, 343 S.E.2d at 614.
66. See, e.g., Hudson v. Blanton, 282 S.C. 70, 316 S.E.2d 432 (1984); Goff v. Bene-
dict, 252 S.C. 83, 165 S.E.2d 269 (1969); Wright v. Alexander, 230 S.C. 286, 95 S.E.2d 500
(1956); Driggers v. Jolly, 219 S.C. 31, 64 S.E.2d 19 (1951); 2 Am. JuR. 2D Adoption § 6
(1964). Adoption did not exist at common law. Indeed, adoption was not accepted in
England until 1926. Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV.
743 (1956). Because adoption is not a common-law right, the controlling statute should
be construed strictly.
67. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1710 (Law. Co-op. 1985). This section provides in perti-
nent part:
An adoption of a child may be decreed when there have been filed written
consents to adoption executed by:
(b) if the child is illegitimate, the mother, regardless of age, and the child's
natural father, if he has consistently on a continuing basis exercised rights and
performed duties as a parent . . ..
68. See D'Augustine v. Bush, 269 S.C. 342, 237 S.E.2d 384 (1977); Goff v. Benedict,
252 S.C. 83, 165 S.E.2d 269 (1969); Driggers v. Jolly, 219 S.C. 31, 64 S.E.2d 19 (1951).
1987]
13
Zwibel: Domestic Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1987
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
result in benefits to the child.6"
Hucks argued that consent should be excused for the follow-
ing reasons: He was the child's natural father; he had agreed
that the mother was to retain custody of the child; and he had
not sought to terminate any of the mother's rights to the child.
The court reasoned, however, that if adoption were granted, the
mother's parental rights would be terminated automatically 0
because there was no statutory provision by which the father
could allow the mother to retain her parental rights.71
The court noted that the father actually sought to legitimize
his son. Adoption was impossible without the mother's consent
and the second method of legitimation, marrying the child's
mother, 2 was a practical impossibility. Nonetheless, the son
should not suffer discrimination because of his illegitimacy
under South Carolina law. Because Hucks has acknowledged his
fatherhood, his son would be treated as legitimate for purposes
of inheritance.73 The child also could bring a wrongful death suit
69. In Hudson v. Blanton the court said, "Here, Blanton has not consented to the
adoption nor have his parental rights been terminated. In this situation, the decree of
adoption must be refused even if the adoption would result in benefits to the child." 282
S.C. at 76, 316 S.E.2d at 435. Similarly, in Goff v. Benedict, the court noted, "[T]he
decree of adoption must be refused, even though adoption would result in benefits to the
child." 252 S.C. at 89, 165 S.E.2d at 272.
70. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1770(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976) provides, "After a final de-
cree of adoption is entered, the natural parents of the adopted child, unless they are the
adoptive parents, shall be relieved of all parental responsibilities for the child and have
no rights over such adopted child."
71. Moreover, the South Carolina Court of Appeals held in McLaughlin v. Strick-
land, 279 S.C. 518, 309 S.E.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1983) that a natural parent's consent to
adoption was not valid where the parent did not consent to relinquish all parental rights,
but instead intended to retain visitation rights. See also Lowe v. Clayton, 264 S.C. 75,
212 S.E.2d 582 (1975). The court in Hucks reiterated this position, but suggested that
"[tihe legislature, not this court, would be a proper body to consider that argument." 288
S.C. at 471, 343 S.E.2d at 615. Under the South Carolina Adoption Act, which became
effective on December 3, 1986, an adoption decree apparently can allow retention of
some rights in the consenting parent. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1770 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1986) in part provides as follows:
[N]otwithstanding any other provision to the contrary in this section, the
adoption of a child by an adoptive parent does not in any way change the legal
relationship between the child and either biological parent of the child whose
parental responsibilities and rights are not expressly affected by the final
decree.
This paragraph, however, was effective only until July 1, 1987. Id.
72. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-60 (Law. Co-op. 1985) confers legitimacy upon a child
born out of wedlock when the parents subsequently marry.
73. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-109 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
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for the death of either of his parents as if he were legitimate."4
In short, an acknowledged child suffers no legal detriment in
South Carolina because of his illegitimacy.The child's status in
other states, however, may not be as fortunate. Whether an ille-
gitimate but acknowledged child is discriminated against by
statute in other states is uncertain, although the United States
Supreme Court has upheld many basic rights of illegitimates.
7 '5
Conceivably, the parents in Hucks could have to litigate a claim
in another state where the pertinent statutes are not as nondis-
criminatory as South Carolina's laws. Were the South Carolina
Legislature to provide a means of legitimization other than
adoption or marriage, this problem of potential discrimination
would be eliminated: when a child has been legitimated in a
state where the child and its father are domiciled, the child will
be held in other states to have the rights of a child born in law-
ful wedlock. 6 Nine state legislatures have already passed such
voluntary legitimization procedures.7
7
Ketta K. Zwibel
74. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1986).
75. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (right to parental support); Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (right of inheritance by intestacy); Mathews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495 (1976) (right to survivor benefits under Social Security Act); Jimenez v. Wein-
berger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (right to disability payments upon death of wage-earner fa-
ther); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (right to recover work-
man's compensation benefits).
76. 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 8 (1938).
77. The nine states are Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1301 (1981); Louisiana,
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. Art. 200 (West Supp. 1983); Maryland, MD. ESTATE AND TRUST CODE
ANN. § 1-208 (Supp. 1982); Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.51111 (West 1980); Missouri,
Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.060 (Vernon Supp. 1983); Nevada, NEv. REV. STAT. § 13-1-09
(1977); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460.29 (1983); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 55 (West 1966); Texas, TEXAS FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 13.01-13.24 (Vernon
Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-12 (1977).
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